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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLAUDE L. HEINER and DAN H. 
HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 880204-CA 
S. J. GROVES & SONS CO., a 
Minnesota corporation and WESTERN 
STATES MINERAL CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appellants offer the following Reply to the Brief of 
Respondents filed on February 10, 1989. For the convenience of 
the Court, Appellants will respond utilizing the organization 
found in Respondents1 Brief. 
While the standard of review cited by Respondents is 
essentially correct (Respondents' Brief, p. 2) Appellants would 
offer the following as a more concise and exact statement of this 
standard: In reviewing the granting of a Motion to Dismiss on the 
pleadings an appellate court is obliged to construe the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and to indulge all 
reasonable inferences in their favor. Penrod v. New and You 
Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 197 6 WESTERN STATES AGREEMENT 
IMPOSES ON WESTERN STATES AN 
OBLIGATION TO MINE COAL THAT RUNS 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS HEINER AND 
HUNTER. 
Respondents contend that Appellants have "tortured" the 
interpretation of paragraph 7.10 of the 1976 Western States 
Agreement in an attempt "to impose on Western States an 
unconditional obligation to mine coal that runs in favor of 
Heiner and Hunter," (Respondents' Brief, p. 10), Both 
Respondents and the quoted portion of the opinion of the lower 
court conclude that the language in the 1976 Agreement referring 
to "obligations" of the 1975 Agreement are owed solely to Dickert 
and Eddy and that there is no duty on the part of the defendants 
to continue mining if Dickert and Eddy agree that such mining may 
cease. (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 10-12). The argument of 
Defendants would be correct had they not also promised Plaintiffs 
to pay a royalty "on all coal produced and sold from the leased 
property by buyer" as contained in paragraph 3.1(d) of the 1976 
Agreement. 
Respondents ignore this language which, under their 
interpretation should read as follows: "Plaintiffs will receive 
an overriding royalty on all coal produced and sold from the 
leased property by buyer unless Dickert and Eddy decide that no 
coal needs to be produced." 
Even from the pleadings themselves, without any reference to 
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the actual events in this transaction, it is obvious that the 
plaintiffs expected to receive royalties based upon the continued 
mining of the property as defined in the 1975 Agreement. 
Otherwise, the overriding royalty provision would be completely 
illusory and would have no enforceability in the future. 
Every contract should be construed in light of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, as evidenced by the 
purpose and language of the contract, so as to give effect to 
what the parties intended at the time the contract was made. 
Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 
144, 146 (Utah 1982); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 
1978). In determining the parties' intentions, a court should 
look to the written agreement executed by the parties, and when 
agreements are executed substantially contemporaneously and are 
clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and 
harmonized, if possible. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
The close proximity of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements together 
with the clear language of the overriding royalty provision 
require this Court to reverse the lower court in its erroneous 
finding that the 1976 Agreement imposed no duty to mine running 
in favor of Heiner and Hunter. The reference to the duty to mine 
in the 1976 Agreement, coupled with the overriding royalty 
provision, create at least an issue of fact as to what the 
parties intended. Applying the standard of review in cases in 
which a complaint is dismissed as a matter of law on the 
pleadings themselves, the plaintiffs ar$ entitled to the reading 
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of the 1976 Agreement that is most favorable to them. That 
reading requires the interpretation that the duty to mine runs in 
their favor and is extinguished only if, as provided in the 1975 
Agreement, all "mineable and merchantable coal" has been removed. 
Under such a reading, Respondents' attempt to circumvent the 1976 
Agreement by making a side deal with Dickert and Eddy is 
actionable. 
POINT II 
THE 1976 WESTERN STATES AGREEMENT WAS 
NOT AN ASSIGNMENT OF ALL OF HEINER'S 
AND HUNTER'S INTERESTS IN THE DOG 
VALLEY MINE. 
Next, Respondents contend that as a matter of law the 1976 
Agreement was an assignment which essentially eliminated any 
rights or interest that Heiner and Hunter had in the transaction. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 12-18). In a nutshell, Respondents 
argue "Western States agreed to step into the shoes of Heiner and 
Hunter and to assume Heiner's and Hunter's obligations under the 
1975 Dickert Agreement." (Respondents' Brief, p. 13). 
Respondents then cite three Utah cases which they claim clearly 
stand for the proposition that the transfer by Heiner and Hunter 
of their entire interest constituted an assignment as a matter of 
law. (Respondents' Brief, p. 14). 
An analysis of these cases, however, does not support this 
contention. First, all three cases involved instances where one 
document was the subject of the litigation. In the instant case, 
on the other hand, the 1976 Agreement included a variety of 
documents including bills of sale of equipment, assigments of 
mining claims, as well as the 1976 Agreement itself. There is no 
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question but that the coal leases were assigned to the 
respondents. The question in this case, however, does not 
concern the coal leases but concerns the language in the 1976 
Agreement which governed the assignment of these leases. Thus, 
presence of a separate controlling document such as this is 
absent from all of the cases relied upon tyy the respondents. 
Second, none of the cases relied upon by the respondents 
involved facts where the assignor was to receive compensation 
based upon conditions which existed in the previous transaction. 
None of these cases involve mining claims in which overriding 
royalties are present. Instead, all of the various interests 
were transferred by the assignor to the assignee with no retained 
interest in the operation of the enterprise. 
Third, in all three cases the actual facts which occurred in 
connection with the transactions, were relied upon by the court 
in making its determinaton. Both the Robinson and Loader cases 
involved trials. The Jensen case involved a motion for summary 
judgment. The conduct of the parties in these cases was an 
important factor in determining their rights. For example, in 
the Jensen case cited by the respondents, 507 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1973) the court focused upon what had happened after the transfer 
by the second party to the third party. The court noted: 
The record reveals that for the first nine months 
Dans Campers issued rental checks to OK Investments; 
thereafter, all rental payments were made by Dans 
Campers or Homes American Style, Inc. directly to 
plaintiff. It is of significance that Dans Campers 
continued to pay a rental of $225 for the initial term 
of three years, as provided in the first lease, rather 
than the increment to $250 after the first year, as 
provided in the second lease. Another aspect of 
significance was a letter from plaintiffs to OK 
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requesting remittance of OK's share of the property 
taxes. This letter was forwarded by OK to Dan Siegel 
with a notation that he should deal directly with 
plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiffs directed their 
request for taxes to Dan Siegel, who, after the death 
of his father, on June 3, 1969, became president of 
Dans Campers. 507 P.2d at 714. (Emphasis added). 
Unlike these cases, however, the lower court dismissed 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint as a matter of law with no understanding as 
to the factual context of the transaction, at issue. At the 
very least there is an ambiguity created as to whether the 1976 
Agreement intended that the royalty payments would continue under 
the terms of the "merchantable coal" standard of the 1975 
Agreement or whether the parties intended that the 1976 Agreement 
and all royalty payments could be terminated at the whim of 
Dickert and Eddy. 
Next, Respondents contend that it is improper for Appellants 
to focus on only a few words "sell" and "purchase" rather than 
the entire agreement. (Respondents* Brief, p. 16). This same 
argument is applicable to Respondents since they are relying only 
upon the documents showing assignment rather than the paragraphs 
and other language contained in the 1976 Agreement showing a 
retained royalty interest in the continuing operation of the 
property. Appellants agree that the entire contract as well as 
the intention of the parties must be considered in construing any 
single provision. The difference is simply that both parties 
construe the whole contract differently. 
Finally, Respondents argue as to the hypothetical originally 
proposed by Appellants concerning the sale of houses that it is 
perfectly proper for C to buy out A and still have the remaining 
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obligation to B but that "nothing in the 1976 Western States 
Agreement imposes on Western States a separate and independent 
obligation to mine coal that runs in favor of Heiner and Hunter." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 17). Again, Respondents thereby in 
effect argue that the "merchantable coal" standard contained in 
the 1976 Agreement is essentially meaningless since from the very 
inception Respondents would only have had to go Dickert and Eddy 
and to eliminate that standard and thereby eliminate any 
expectation of royalties to Appellants. 
The difficulty with Respondents' argument is that it assumes 
that Heiner and Hunter, in defining the royalty to be paid, were 
not relying upon the previous obligation and conditions of mining 
established in the 1975 contract. To illustrate this example, 
assume that instead of selling a house as in the previous 
example, A sells a service station business to B with the 
provision that A will receive 10% of the business profits of the 
service station. B then sells the service station to C with the 
provision that B shall receive an additional 5% of the service 
station profits and that C fulfill B's obligation to pay 10% to 
A. C decides that the service station is no longer profitable 
and wishes to build apartment buildings in its place. He goes to 
A and A agrees to release C from the obligation to keep the the 
service station in business and pay him the 10% profit. 
Respondents would contend that at that point B's interest in 5% 
of the profits is automatically eliminated since it is solely 
within A's discretion as to whether the service station would 
continue. Appellants, on the other hand, would contend B has his 
-7-
own interest in maintaining this service station business and 
that C must also obtain permission from B before a change of use 
in the land can occur. Simply put, B's rights under the B-C 
contract are meaningless unless the B-C contract is read to 
impose upon C a contract continuing the obligation to B to keep 
the service station open, rather than to merely satisfy A, 
The lower court basically held that the drafters of the 1976 
Agreement failed to clearly indicate their intent to include a 
"merchantable coal" standard for terminating that agreement. 
There is little question but that had the 1976 Agreement stated 
that Respondents (i.e., the buyer) would owe a royalty "on all 
coal produced and sold from the leased property by buyer and that 
buyer should commence mining operations for coal with reasonable 
dispatch and continue such mining operations until all of the 
reasonably mineable and merchantable coal has been removed and 
sold" Respondents would definitely have an underlying obligation 
to Appellants to continue the mining operation, so long as there 
were merchantable coal. The absence of specific reincorporation 
in the 1976 Agreement of the "duty to mine" requirement contained 
in the 1975 Agreement caused the lower court to conclude that the 
royalty provision only applied to whatever coal was taken from 
the property and that there was no definite requirement as to 
when the mining had to occur. 
This reasoning is analogous to the previous example where B 
simply provides that B is entitled to 5% of the "profits of the 
business" (relying upon the previous agreement with A that such 
service station business must continue at that location) as 
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opposed to a more detailed clause in which it is stated that a 
fixed percentage of the service station business would be paid to 
B and that such service station business will continue 
indefinitely at that location. 
While it would be nice to always clearly state provisions at 
the time a contract is entered into which may later be disputed, 
the reality of commercial life is simply that many items are not 
as clearly stated as they could be after a particular problem 
subsequently arises. However, a court shpuld not become focused 
upon technical interpretations of language but should instead, as 
noted previously, try to construe all of the agreements together 
so as to best effect the intentions of the parties as evidenced 
by the agreements. It is just as logical in the instant case to 
assume that the parties intended the royalty requirement of the 
1976 Agreement to be based upon the duty to mine contained in the 
1975 Agreement as to assume that Appellants were simply hoping 
for a royalty should any mining occur on the property at the whim 
of the respondents and Dickert and Eddy. 
Again, it must be emphasized that this case arises on a 
motion to dismiss in which no factual inquiry of the 
circumstances surrounding this transaction has been made. Only 
if, as a matter of law, no cause of action can be stated, can 
this decision to dismiss the complaint be sustained. 
POINT III 
THE 1981 DICKERT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED 
A BREACH OF OBLIGATION TO HEINER AND 
HUNTER. 
Respondents argue that the 1981 Dicftert Agreement completely 
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annihilated any obligations existing under the 1976 Agreement 
between Appellants and Respondents. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
18-20). They contend that Respondents could have stopped mining 
coal at any time and could have reconveyed the leases to Dickert 
and Eddy but that since Respondents desired to maintain the 
property they merely substituted monthly payments instead of 
royalty payments paid on coal actually mined. 
If Respondents' argument were correct, it is difficult to 
udnerstand why paragraph 9.4 of the 1976 Agreement provides that 
"Sellers (Appellants) shall have the right to damages . . . for 
loss of their bargain by reason of the default of Buyer 
(Respondents)." Clearly, this provision alone shows an intent 
that the contract continue and that the property continue to be 
mined; otherwise, there could be no bargain to be lost or basis 
for damages. It is apparent that the whole purpose of the 1975 
and 1976 Agreements was to insure that the property would be 
commercially mined and that ore would be extracted from it. 
The 1981 Dickert Agreement can not circumvent the 1976 
Agreement's requirement that an overriding royalty be paid nor 
its provisions for damages in the event that the Appellants fail 
to meet their obligations. As noted earlier, Appellants were 
never parties to the 1981 Agreement and therefore cannot be bound 
by any terms that were agreed upon by the other parties. 
POINT IV 
WESTERN STATES DID NOT HONOR ITS 
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH. 
Finally, Respondents contend that it did not breach any 
implied covenant of good faith in entering into the 1981 Dickert 
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Agreement. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 20-$2). First, Respondents 
contend that the issue of bad faith was not raised by Appellants. 
However, paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint clearly states 
that by entering into the 1981 Agreement and by suspending mining 
operations Respondents breached their duty under the Agreement to 
extract mineable coal and pay Plaintiffs1 royalty. Certainly, 
part of this "breach" includes the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing that is found in all contracts. Berube v. 
Fashion Center Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah, March 20, 
1989); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
The failure to utilize good faith is a breach of contract just as 
surely as a specific breach to specific terms. 
By entering into the 1981 Agreement without any attempt to 
involve Heiner and Hunter, Respondents clearly and unequivocably 
breached the spirit and intent of the 1976 Agreement. Appellants 
did not sell and assign their interests in these mining 
properties so that Respondents could hold onto them until such 
time as they deemed it advisable to mine them. Rather, both the 
1975 and 1976 Agreements required an active mining of the 
property in order that the overriding royalties be paid to 
Appellants as well as Dickert and Eddy. Respondents satisfied 
Dickert and Eddy by agreeing to make them a monthly payment not 
based upon ore produced but based upon a minimum monthly rental. 
Had they not done so Dickert and Eddy could clearly have 
terminated the contract for failure to comply with the mining 
requirement. By entering into the 1981 Agreement the respondents 
satisfied Dickert and Eddy but such agreement did not eliminate 
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the separate obligation existing to the appellants to mine the 
property. 
If Respondents had a -valid reason for not mining the 
property and for holding it in direct violation of the mining 
requirements of the 1975 lease, then it is reasonable that they 
should have notified Appellants in order to satisfy them and to 
give them some type of compensation during the inactive mining 
period. Instead, they completely ignored Appellants as if their 
royalty did not exist. 
Since "good faith" is a question of fact based upon the 
circumstances, it cannot be said at this juncture whether 
Respondents, as a matter of law, breached this requirement or 
whether they were justified in taking the actions that they took. 
However, in any event, Appellants are entitled to conduct 
discovery and to have an evidentiary hearing upon the actions of 
the Respondents so that a trier of fact can determine whether of 
Respondents breached their duties under the 1976 Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
A dismissal based upon the pleadings is a drastic remedy. 
As shown, the 1976 Agreement may reasonably be interpreted as 
urged by Appellants. There is at least a question of fact as to 
the proper interpretation such that this matter should be allowed 
to proceed further for discovery and for evidentiary hearing. 
The lower court was certainly incorrect in deciding as a matter 
of law that under no set of circumstances could Appellants 
prevail in their claim against Respondents. The matter should 
therefore be reversed for further proceedings. 
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DATED this 31st day of March, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Reed L. Martineau 
Stephen J. Hill 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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